እንሆ ሕጂ ድማ ምሽብሻብ ድግስ ኪዳን ተጀሚሩ። ኣብዚ ኣኼባ ሰበ-ሰላማዊ ኣገባብን ኩለእንተናዊ ቃልሲ በሃልትን፡ ሰበ ቊ. 3ን 4ን፡ ስልጣን ምስ-ሓዝና-እዝን-እትን-ክን ገግረልኩም ኢና በሃልትን ክልተ ዕላማታት ከመዝግቡ ክፍትኑ እዮም። ቀዳማይ ዕላማ ንኪዳን ከም ተካኢ ዲክታቶርነት ኢሳያስ ምውዳብ ክኸውን ከሎ፡ እቲ ኻልኣይ ድማ ብደገፍ ፎሩም ሰንዓ ፊናሳዊ ህላወኦም ምርግጋጽ እዩ። ውድባት ኪዳን ሓገዝ ፎርም ሰንዓ ንሰልሰተ ወርሒ እንተ ዝሳኣኖም ምተበታተኑ። ኣብ ድግስ ኪዳን ምእንቲ ትግባረ ሕልሚ ዲክታቶራዊ መንግስቶም ክብሉ እዞም መራኸቢ ዘይብሎም ውድባት ኣብ እኩይ ውዕል ክእትዉ ክጽዕሩ እዮም። እቲ ቀዳማይ ክሕደት ነኣሽቱ ውድባት ብምባልን፡ ምንጥልጣልን ካብ ኪዳን ብምብራርን ብምንዋሕ እስትንፋስ ዲክታቶር ኢሳይስን ተዛዚሙ፡ ሕጂ ተሪፉ ዘሎ እቲ ካልኣይ ዓቢ ክሕደት ወይ ወዶገባነት እዩ።
ደገፍቲ ሓዳስ ኤርትራ ኣብ ትሕቲ ጉልባብ እዮም ዝስተሩ እምበር ኣብ ብርሃን ንነፍሶም ኣየጋልጹን እዮም። ሓደ ካብቲ ምጐልበቢኦም ቻርተር ኪዳን ክኸውን ከሎ፡ እተን ውልቃዊ ውድባት ድማ ነናተን ንመሸፈኒ ዝዀነን ፕሮግራማት ኣለወን። እዚ ተንኰል’ዚ ነቲ ኣብ መንጎ ሓዳሽ ኤርትራን ሃገረ ኤርትራን ዘሎ ወሳኒ ግጥምያ ንምህሳስ ዝተማህዘ እዩ። ኣብ መወዳእትኡ ህዝቢ ንስትራተጂ ዓዲ ከም ሰንደቕ ዕላምኡ ምስ ኣልዓለ ወዶገባውያን ኣንጻር ሰልፊ ጉባኤን ሓይሊ ኣምስተርዳምን ከኸቱ ይረኣዩ። ብርግጽ ነቲ ብ2000 ዝተበገሰ ደሞክራስያዊ ሓይሊ ኣናዊሖሞ ደኣ እምበር ሰዓብቲ ሀገረ-ኤርትራስ ካብ ቅዱስ መልእኽቶም ኣይተመዛበሉን።
መራሕቲ ኪዳን እግሪ-እግርና ዘብ-ዘብ ዝብል ዝተዘወረ/ፎርጅድ ጽላሎት ምሂዞም ስለ ዘለዉ ህዝብና ምእንታን ከይደናገር መጸውዒ ሰልፍና ዳግም ከምዚ ዝስዕብ ክኸውን እዩ፡ ”ሰልፊ ጉባኤ ኤርትራ (ስትራተጂ ዓዲ)”። ኣብ ታሕቲ ብእንግሊዝንያ ዝተደርሰ ጽሑፍ ሰልፊ ጉባኤ ኤርትራ ተመልከት።
ሰልፊ ጉባኤ ኤርትራ (ስትራተጂ ዓዲ)
2000-10-08
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The Eritrean opposition
1.1 The Background
It needs to be emphasized that the totalitarian dictatorship that prevails in Eritrea does not permit an opening for an entry point for encompassing change. The only thinkable entry point for democracy may rest with some sectors of the Eritrean opposition forces that are dedicated to the removal of the dictatorial system. The propagation of the principles of constitutional democracy, today, is certain to prepare the ground for radical change in the post-dictatorship period. It is for this purpose that we are examining the Eritrean opposition.
After independence, the non-EPLF organizations were ridiculed as failures by the Eritrean public and the leaders of our region; as such, our neighbours denied these organizations the permission to operate from their territories. In these circumstances the disoriented and apathetic non-EPLF organizations were reduced to operating clandestinely in the Sudan. The emergence of the Eritrean Jihad, capable of standing its ground in military confrontations with the dictator’s troops, lifted the spirits of the non-EPLF organizations, and gained support among some sectors of Eritrean Muslims. Sudanese support and access to massive funds from Saudi Arabia and some of the Gulf countries, made it possible for the Eritrean Jihad movement to promote an Islamic revolution that mobilized Eritrean refugees in the Sudan.
Another impulse to the growth of an organized opposition was the outbreak of the Eritrean/Ethiopian war. The non-EPLF organizations were able to establish an umbrella organization they named: the ‘Eritrean National Alliance’. Ethiopian support gave the Alliance a new lease of life that made it possible for them to intensify their military activities against Issayas. Nevertheless, Ethiopia was disappointed with the performance of the Alliance.
The most important development in the growth of the opposition movement was the birth of the democratic movement in the Diaspora. The Stockholm Conference for Democracy in Eritrea (funded by the Palme International Centre) was held in December 2000. Mrs. Palme opened the conference that was attended by the main Swedish parliamentary political parties and Eritrean intellectuals. It was at this conference that the ‘Eritrean Cooperative Party’ was established.
In North America a similar democratic movement was spearheaded by the Eritrean Alliance Involvement Movement (EAIM). These two currents of the democratic upsurge played a great role in the fight for democracy, and the equally important fight to stop the war. In 2005, these two sisterly organizations joined five other organizations, to establish the ‘Eritrean Congress Party’, in Khartoum.
1.2 The 5th Conference of the Eritrean National Alliance (ENA)
There were qualitative differences between the 5th conference and the previous four conferences:
The first difference was that the 5th conference was held when the war stopped, and the warring nations decided to submit the conflict to negotiations and international arbitration. This removed the stigma of ‘collaboration with the enemy’ that had plagued the Alliance.
The second qualitative difference was given a hefty push when the democratic forces of the Diaspora, the Cooperative Party and the EAIM, decided to join forces with the Alliance.
The third difference came about when Ethiopia, the Sudan, and the Yemen, decided to establish a forum of cooperation and friendship at the time the 5th conference of the Alliance was convoked in Addis. These countries of the Sana’a Forum resolved to support the reorganized Alliance; as a result, the ENA was recognized by the region, thereby, elevating its status.
Unfortunately, one of the organizations withdrew from the Alliance over the issue of who should fill the post of the secretary general of the ENA. This organization, in consort with a breakaway organization from the PFDJ, conducted a combined campaign that, in the end, cooled the enthusiasm of the Sana’a Forum for the ENA.
1.3 The Eritrean Democratic Alliance (EDA)
In 2005, the secretary general of the ENA mediated, under the auspices of the Sudanese government, to bring together the four opposition organizations operating at that time. At this meeting they agreed to hold a conference in Khartoum, where a new Alliance named the ‘Eritrean Democratic Alliance’ (EDA) was established. In many ways the EDA was a continuation of the ENA, with the exception of a central shift of strategy. The strategy of removing the totalitarian regime by all means available was replaced by the strategy of negotiations with the dictator on the basis of the Southern Sudan model. The ENA’s strategy of convoking a national congress (that included the civil societies, the Diaspora communities, and the refugee camps in the neighbouring countries) was also cancelled. This shift of strategy was promoted by the two anti-ENA organizations mentioned above.
1.4 The Failure of the Umbrella Model
The 5th conference, and the support of the Sana’a Forum for it, created fear and confusion in the dictator’s camp: he reacted by hiring professional propagandists to conduct an intensive anti-ENA campaign. The two mentioned anti-Alliance organizations also conducted an intensive campaign against the ENA and its secretary general. All this resulted in the failure of the umbrella type of organization. Today, the Eritrean opposition is divided into those that wish to reconcile with the dictator and the camp that struggles to implement a constitutional and democratic Eritrea at peace with itself and at peace with its neighbours. Clearly, the EDA is not a suitable vehicle for the implementation of an all-embracing constitutional democracy in Eritrea.
1.5 Promoting Democratic Change in Eritrea
As it should be clear by now, the only way of implanting democracy in Eritrea is to conduct a resilient struggle against the dictatorial system. This goal may be achieved by a) the selective support of opposition parties in order to promote a social revolution inside the country, b) the mobilization of regional and international pressure for the implementation of democratic elections in dictatorial Eritrea, and c) organizing a caretaker government in exile. Due to the fructuous character of the so-called Eritrean opposition, such a government may be built on the basis of General de Gaul’s Résistance model during the 2nd World War. That is to say, such a government needs to be established around political personalities who have the support of the Eritrean people, and the confidence of our region.
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